Greg Detre
Sunday, March 31, 2002
How do I know that you are not a humanoid-shaped robot? Should it matter to me if you were? (2001)
Could you be, or have been: (a) a brain in a vat? (b) someone born in the eighteenth century? (c) Tony Blair? Choose any one, and explain your answer. (2001)
What are the most serious problems for physicalists? Or What are the most serious problems for dualists? (2001)
'Functionalism is based on a mistake, because mental states are individuated by their rational relations to each other, not by their causal interrelations.' Discuss. (2001)
Assume that monism is preferable to dualism. Which then is preferable, materialism or mentalism? (2000)
'Zombies are outwardly behaviourally identical to living human beings but have no conscious experience. Australian zombies are molecule-for-molecule identical to living human beings but have no conscious experience.' Could there be any zombies? Could there be any Australian zombies? (2000)
What is the best way to formulate functionalism as a theory of mental phenomena? (2000)
In what sense, if any, is thinking action? (2000)
What makes a state of a person a mental state? (1999)
Can a functionalist account for our knowledge of our own minds? (1999)
Can a materialist cope with the consideration that a thought, but not a brain process, can be original, illogical, true or confused? (1999)
'There could be an exact physical replica of you that lacked consciousness.' What arguments might be advanced for and against this possibility? (1998)
'The only way to treat the mind as a part of the natural world is to reduce mental phenomena to physical ones.' Discuss. (1998)
'What the sentences of my language mean may depend on contingent facts about my environment, but the content of my mental states cannot do so.' Discuss. (1998)
Can functionalism give an adequate account of beliefs? (1998)
Are there any psycho-physical laws? Can this be settled a priori? (1998)
Is Davidson's anomalous monism a form of epiphenomenalism? (1998)
'For all I know, the way things look to me is constantly changing, but I never notice, because of compensating memory errors.' Does this make sense? (2001)
What are the most serious problems for physicalists? Or What are the most serious problems for dualists? (2001)
Can there be consciousness without self-consciousness? (2001)
Could there be a science of the mind? (2000)
'Consciousness is an entirely private, first-person phenomenon' (DAMASIO). Has philosophy given us reason to doubt this? (2000)
Can a subject of experience be directly aware of itself? (2000)
Is it right to say that a mental state is conscious if and only if it is accompanied by a thought about that state? (1999)
'There could be an exact physical replica of you that lacked consciousness.' What arguments might be advanced for and against this possibility? (1998)
Could you be, or have been: (a) a brain in a vat? (b) someone born in the eighteenth century? (c) Tony Blair? Choose any one, and explain your answer. (2001)
'I know that someone is feeling frightened, but I don't know if it is me.' Could someone be in this epistemic position? If not, why not? (2001)
What would a Martian-or an angel-have to be like to be a person? (2000)
Is there such a thing as the self? What is the best case that can be made for its existence? (2000)
Does 'I' refer to a body, a mind, a composite of body and mind, or nothing at all? (1999)
If I am aware simultaneously of rising anger and of a sharp pain in my leg, what makes it the case that the anger and the pain are felt by the same person? (1998)
If A shoots B, and B dies eight hours later: when did A do what? Or What causes actions? (2001)
How would you explain weakness of will? (2001)
'A basic action is something we do, and do intentionally, and don't do by doing anything else.' What useful role can this notion play? (2000)
In what sense, if any, is thinking action? (2000)
What causal antecedents does an intentional action have to have? (2000)
'Conscious decisions to perform actions occur after the physical processes that lead to the execution of those actions have been initiated.' If this is true, does it threaten our autonomy or freedom of will? (2000)
Is there anything puzzling in the phenomenon of weakness of will? (2000)
Are actions made voluntary by acts of will? If not, what makes them so? (1999)
Is it sufficient for intending to act that one should desire to act and believe that one will do so? (1999)
Is every case of doing something intentionally also a case of trying to do something? (1998)
'If the will is free, then no scientific study of the mind is possible.' Discuss. (1998)
Are hallucinations also perceptions? Discuss in connection with your views on the causal theory of perception. Or 'In thought the mind is active, but in perception it is a passive receiver.' Discuss. (2001)
Is introspection a form of perception? (2000)
'Dreams can tell us about ourselves.' Can they? (2001)
Does perception always involve the having of belief? (1999)
Can there be a criterion of whether we are awake or dreaming? (1999)
Does perception always involve the having of belief? (1999)
Can there be a criterion of whether we are awake or dreaming? (1999)
Can a functionalist account for our knowledge of our own minds? (1999)
What has to be true if I remember a past experience 'from the inside'? (2000)
How much can someone seeing a tree and someone hallucinating a tree have in common, mentally speaking? (2000)
'The most important difference between a sensation and an emotion is that emotions, unlike sensations, are directed to objects' (KENNY). Discuss. (1999)
Does the content of a thought ever depend on factors external to the mind of the thinker? Of what significance is it if it does? (1999)
How does seeing a bloody dagger differ from hallucinating one? (1998)
Is folk psychology a false and stagnating theory that will simply mislead us, in the twenty-first century? (2001)
'Folk psychology is not concerned with the hidden neural machinery that lies behind behaviour, and no discovery about the nature of that machinery can pose a threat to folk psychology.' Discuss. (2000)
Is there something it is like, experientially speaking, to understand a sentence? (2000)
Can there be thought without language? (1999)
'What the sentences of my language mean may depend on contingent facts about my environment, but the content of my mental states cannot do so.' Discuss. (1998)
Can languageless creatures have beliefs and desires? What sorts of beliefs and desires might they have? (1998)
Are emotions essentially unreasonable? (2001)
'Functionalism is based on a mistake, because mental states are individuated by their rational relations to each other, not by their causal interrelations.' Discuss. (2001)
'Beliefs are individuated by their conceptual roles.' 'Beliefs are individuated by their truth conditions.' Is either of these principles correct? Are they compatible? (2001)
'The principle on which we "solve the other minds problem" is: same-causes-same-effects, and relevantly-similar-causes-relevantly-similar-effects' (SEARLE). Is it? (1999)
'There are two statements contradicting one another: one is that feelings are essentially hidden; the other, that someone is hiding his feelings from me' (WITTGENSTEIN). Discuss. (1999)
Can a materialist cope with the consideration that a thought, but not a brain process, can be original, illogical, true or confused? (1999)
'The most important difference between a sensation and an emotion is that emotions, unlike sensations, are directed to objects' (KENNY). Discuss. (1999)
Is it sufficient for intending to act that one should desire to act and believe that one will do so? (1999)
Could there be satisfactory explanations of human behaviour which made no appeal to beliefs or desires? (1999)
'From the subject's point of view, remembering something is just like imagining it.' What differentiates memory and imagination? (1998)
'Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of the unweaned infant is not a pretence?' (WITTGENSTEIN). Am I over-hasty in my assumption that your smile is not a pretence? (1998)
Can languageless creatures have beliefs and desires? What sorts of beliefs and desires might they have? (1998)
What is the relationship between fearing a dog, and judging that it is dangerous? (1998)
Could there be a science of the mind? (2000)
'Dreams can tell us about ourselves.' Can they? (2001)
'Consciousness is an entirely private, first-person phenomenon' (DAMASIO). Has philosophy given us reason to doubt this? (2000)
What, if anything, is meant by 'emotional intelligence'? (2000)
Is introspection a form of perception? (2000)
Is empiricism coherent as a theory of mind? (2000)
'The principle on which we "solve the other minds problem" is: same-causes-same-effects, and relevantly-similar-causes-relevantly-similar-effects' (SEARLE). Is it? (1999)
'The only way to treat the mind as a part of the natural world is to reduce mental phenomena to physical ones.' Discuss. (1998)
'Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of the unweaned infant is not a pretence?' (WITTGENSTEIN). Am I over-hasty in my assumption that your smile is not a pretence? (1998)
'Dreams can tell us about ourselves.' Can they? (2001)
'There are two statements contradicting one another: one is that feelings are essentially hidden; the other, that someone is hiding his feelings from me' (WITTGENSTEIN). Discuss. (1999)
Self-deception is motivated. But by what, and how does it work? (2001)
'There are no cases of self-deception, only cases of wishful thinking.' Discuss. (1998)
Can the mind change the world? (1999)
'Self-ascription [of mental states] depends on other-ascription [of them]' (P F STRAWSON). Does it, and if so why? (1998)
1. How do I know that you are not a humanoid-shaped
robot? Should it matter to me if you were?
2. Could you be, or have been: (a) a brain in a vat?
7. Either What are the most serious problems for
physicalists? Or What are the most serious problems for dualists?
8. 'For all I know, the way things look to me is
constantly changing, but I never notice, because of compensating memory
errors.' Does this make sense?
9. Can there be consciousness without
self-consciousness?
13. 'Functionalism is based on a mistake, because
mental states are individuated by their rational relations to each other, not
by their causal interrelations.' Discuss.
1. Assume that monism is preferable to dualism.
Which then is preferable, materialism or mentalism?
2. 'Consciousness is an entirely private,
first-person phenomenon' (DAMASIO). Has philosophy given us reason to doubt
this?
Could there be a science of the mind?
5. What would a Martian-or an angel-have to be like
to be a person?
6. 'Zombies are outwardly behaviourally identical to
living human beings but have no conscious experience. Australian zombies are
molecule-for-molecule identical to living human beings but have no conscious
experience.' Could there be any zombies? Could there be any Australian zombies?
7. Is there something it is like, experientially
speaking, to understand a sentence?
8. What is the best way to formulate functionalism
as a theory of mental phenomena?
9. EITHER
Can a subject of experience be directly aware of
itself?
10. Is there such a thing as the self? What is the
best case that can be made for its existence?
12. Is empiricism coherent as a theory of mind?
15. 'Conscious decisions to perform actions occur
after the physical processes that lead to the execution of those actions have
been initiated.' If this is true, does it threaten our autonomy or freedom of
will?
1. What makes a state of a person a mental state?
5. Can a functionalist account for our knowledge of
our own minds?
7. Can a materialist cope with the consideration
that a thought, but not a brain process, can be original, illogical, true or
confused?
8. Does 'I' refer to a body, a mind, a composite of
body and mind, or nothing at all?
11. Can there be thought without language?
13. Is it right to say that a mental state is
conscious if and only if it is accompanied by a thought about that state?
14. Can the mind change the world?
15. Does the content of a thought ever depend on
factors external to the mind of the thinker? Of what significance is it if it
does?
1. 'There could be an exact physical replica of you
that lacked consciousness.' What arguments might be advanced for and against
this possibility?
3. 'From the subject's point of view, remembering
something is just like imagining it.' What differentiates memory and
imagination?
4. Can functionalism give an adequate account of
beliefs?
'The only way to treat the mind as a part of the
natural world is to reduce mental phenomena to physical ones.' Discuss.
OR
Are there any psycho-physical laws? Can this be
settled a priori?
9. Can languageless creatures have beliefs and
desires? What sorts of beliefs and desires might they have?
10. Is Davidson's anomalous monism a form of
epiphenomenalism?
11. 'If the will is free, then no scientific study
of the mind is possible.' Discuss.